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Delaware’s Dominance: A Peculiar Illustration of American Federalism
Robert B. Thompson

Who makes corporate law has often been as important as its substance. The
traditional presentation accepts state law as the predominant source of corporate rules and
focuses on the “race between the states” dimension of the “who makes corporate law”
question. For the last half century or more the accepted wisdom has been that Delaware
has won this race for corporation charters and the money that comes with it, although
states and commentators probe for chinks in the Delawarean armor. In many ways, this
discussion is still framed by the key question of corporate law from the 1960s and 1970s:
is Delaware’s dominance explained by a “race to the bottom” skewing corporate law in
favor of management interests who influence state lawmaking at the expense of
shareholders or by a “race to the top” with state law incorporating rules that reflect
preferences made through markets.1 This race between the states, however, cannot be
understood without examining two other dimensions—the extent to which we rely on
markets or government for corporate rule-making and the federalism dimension of
apportioning responsibility between federal and state governments.
For the first half of our country’s history after independence, none of the three
dimensions was of particular importance. Corporate law was almost entirely at the state
level with some United States Supreme Court cases reinforcing the right of corporations
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to own property, make contracts, and to sue and be sued that had been commonly
extended to collective entities in English law and elsewhere.2 Government regulation of
entities (e.g. their permitted purposes, size, and duration) were common and followed
from the sovereign’s capacity to create corporations. Things changed in the last decade
or so of the nineteenth century. State authorization of corporations to own stock in other
corporations and the decline of state ability to regulate foreign corporations opened the
way for states to openly compete for corporations headquartered in neighboring states.
The content of the state corporations statutes also dramatically changed. “Laissez faire”
statutes in New Jersey in 1896, soon followed elsewhere, signaled a shift to private
ordering and markets at a time when the decline of ultra vires, quo waranto and
regulation of foreign corporations first made it possible for a state to attract substantial
incorporation business from its neighbors. Some current illustrations of the race between
the states, for example, bylaws limiting where suits can be brought, reflect this dimension
as well. The regulatory impulse of the earlier corporations statutes, however, did not
disappear. It simply moved to federal law, setting up the federalism dimension of the
“who makes corporate law” debate.
This chapter examines the contemporary interaction of corporate law along these
three dimensions with a particular focus on federalism. In the same way that we often
frame the race between the states in the examples of the 1960s and 1970s, the concepts of
federalism that we bring to the discussion date from the New Deal and focus on whether
the federal government will preempt state corporate law, usually by adding regulation to
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a space that state law has left to private ordering.3 Corporate law federalism is different
than the classic constitutional doctrine of our history and bears only faint resemblance to
contemporary federalism discussions in areas such as education, energy and
environmental law. An ”on-off “view of allocating law-making power between state or
federal government has given way in other fields to a more nuanced view of interactive
federalism. This chapter presents the richer and more nuanced space of 21st century
corporate law federalism that has some points in common with federalism discussion in
other subject areas and some that reflect the particular history of the development of
corporate law. The last section suggests how this federalism dimension influences the
race between the states dimension of who makes corporate law in a way that essentially
has locked Delaware’s dominance in place.

I.

The Point of Inflection for “Who Makes Corporate Law”

Delaware rose to preeminence in the incorporation market after a key point of
inflection for corporate law. Fort the first half of American history (to date) corporate
law moved through waves of significant changes, all focused in state law: acceptance of
limited liability for shareholders, the rise of general incorporation statutes, a strong shift
to director-centric corporate governance, and authorization of corporations’ owning
stock in other corporations, among others.4 Then around the turn of the 20th century,
Delaware quickly followed New Jersey in a move to a laissez-faire statute. In the time
since that point state corporation law has been much more stable in the now familiar
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Delaware approach of default rules that can be modified by the parties but providing a
governance structure centralized in the board and management with only a limited role
for shareholders. When Delaware and New Jersey abandoned the traditional state law
regulation of corporate behavior at the end of the 19th century, that regulatory impulse
did not die, it just moved to federal law. Ever since, Delaware, and those other states
who wish to compete with it, have remained free to focus on centralized governance and
private ordering, adjusting as necessary to insure that the entity retained sufficient
flexibility to adapt to new economic changes. If the result was that directors and
managers got too powerful, federal law picked up the slack, first in antitrust law and
labor and consumer regulation of corporate behavior and increasingly by federalization
of parts of the traditional Delaware space of core corporate governance.

A. American corporate law in the 18th and 19th century
There were very few business corporations at the time of the founding of the
American republic.5 The corporate form passed down from the king’s government had
been used mostly for religious or charitable purposes or quasi-public (bridge or turnpike)
entities. Fundamental economic and financial changes as the industrial revolution spread
increased the scale of business and the size of the market in which entrepreneurs could
compete effectively. By the 1830s, manufacturing corporations exceeded those in
banking, insurance, and public service and the number was growing.6 There was a greater
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need for enterprises which assembled the capital from more than one person.7 There was
a greater need for legal rule to reflect and facilitate these developments and to
accommodate the political will evident in the Jacksonian era to democratize the
availability of the corporate form.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, there were many dramatic shifts in
corporate law:
•

Limited liability for shareholders (and for officers and directors) became the legally
provided norm (although liability for double the amount of money paid for shares was
common even after limited liability was inserted into law);8

•

General incorporation statutes as opposed to special chartering by the legislature
spread through the middle decades of the nineteenth century (although here, too, the
change was gradual, not a dramatic on-off switch, as many states continued special
chartering alongside general incorporation until late in the century9 and in Delaware,
for example, the number of special charters greatly exceeded those provided under
the general statute);10

•

Corporate law moved strongly toward centralized management, reflected in a shift
from the importance of the general meeting of shareholders to broad powers for

7

Shaw Livermore, Early American Land Companies, Their Influence on Corporate Development
(Commonwealth Fund) (1939).
8
Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173
(1986).
9
Eric Hilt, Corporations Law and the Shift Toward Open Access in the Antebellum United States, National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper # 21195 (2015).
10
Samuel Arsht, The History of Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. 1 (1976).

5

directors11 and a centralized structure that could accommodate the rising influence of
middle management;12
•

Late in the century, changes in corporate law permitted corporations to own stock in
other corporations, permitting holding companies that facilitated companies doing
business outside their state of incorporation when prior law had often prohibited such
action.13

All of these changes occurred in state law—one at a time, eventually spreading to most of
the country. Federal incorporation was initially in some doubt under the constitution and
seldom used. The United States Supreme Court irregularly took up issues related to
corporations, for example Dartmouth College in 1819,14 Bank of Augusta v. Earle in
1839 (that declined to find a constitutional right for corporations to operate outside their
state of incorporation),15 and a series of constitutional cases after the Civil War that
protected corporations’ rights to contract, own property and sue and be sued.16
B. The Appearance of the Three Dimensions of “Who Makes Corporate Law”
By the late 1880s all the elements of the modern corporation were in view,
something that was not true a century before. But none of the three dimensions of “who
makes law” had yet to gather a critical mass. In the 1890s, however, the competition and
race between states for incorporation business accelerated, led by New Jersey. Its chosen
11
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method of competition was to abandon the regulatory posture of prior corporate law in
favor of what was termed “laissez faire” corporations statutes, thereby defining the
regulatory/private ordering dimension. The federal government’s continued adherence to
a regulatory agenda as to corporations, first visible in antitrust laws, rules regarding
employment and consumers, and limits on corporate political contributions, set up the
federalism dimension of our topic.17
This point of inflection is noticeable and dramatic. Professor Joel Seligman
termed it a “revolution wrought in the law of corporations” that “turned corporate law
inside out.” 18 Professor (later Supreme Court Justice) Wiley Rutledge described this
period as “destined eventually to reverse the historic policy of the states to place state
policy fundamentally in opposition to that of the Federal government.”19
New Jersey was the epicenter of this development, in part as its home state
lawyers sought to take business from the big city just across the river. Amendments to
the New Jersey corporations statute in 1888 and 1889 authorized corporations to own
stock in other corporations.20 This power proved very helpful when state courts in
Louisiana, New York and Ohio found trusts (an innovation of clever lawyers for Standard
Oil in the early 1880s) violated their still restrictive corporations statutes not permitting
operation outside the state of incorporation.21 James Dill, one of the lawyers pushing this
early statute returned in 1896 to draft liberalizations of New Jersey’s general
incorporation act that removed limits on corporate duration, purpose, and size, explicitly
17
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authorized carrying on business in other jurisdictions, provided for mergers and
consolidations, and added new management flexibility like permitting director
amendment of bylaws.22 New Jersey’s incorporation revenues quickly grew, noticeably
at the expense of New York, and other states followed its lead, including Delaware in
1899. New Jersey gave up some of its advantage when President-elect Woodrow Wilson
pushed reform in the state’s corporate law prior to leaving Trenton for Washington.23 As
law students quickly learn, Delaware has long had the dominant position in the race
among the states.
There were other reasons, of course, for this change. Dramatic changes in the
economy made some see the emergence of large scale corporate concentration as
necessary, if not inevitable.24 There was a decline in traditional corporate doctrines like
ultra vires and quo warranto that had been used to cabin corporate acts and a similar
shriveling of state efforts to assert control over foreign corporations.25 And there was
widespread concern about overall changes in state law. Three American presidents in the
early 20th century called for federal incorporation; each failed.26 Calls for federal
incorporation reappeared at the time of New Deal efforts to combat the Great Depression,
but President Franklin Roosevelt and the Congress opted only for a partial federal
response—securities laws that emphasized disclosure to protect investors and
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shareholders (and additional regulation of brokers, mutual funds and holding companies
that increased social control over the financial sector).27
The New Deal pattern set the stage for the federalism dimension of “who makes
corporate law” that continues to today. Congress can, if it wishes, (and given the
outcome of the New Deal era Supreme Court decisions on the commerce clause) preempt
state corporations laws. Even though Congress has not chosen to do so, it and the
Securities and Exchange Commission have regularly imposed federal rules on corporate
governance, usually motivated by a financial scandal or crisis that has pointed out failings
of large corporations. For example, federal rules force public corporations to have
mostly independent directors on their boards and audit, compensation and nomination
committees made up entirely of such directors.28 State law, consistent with the dominant
laissez faire mode, has no requirements for who can be directors.29 Federal law requires
key officers to certify key financial documents; state law lacks such requirement or
specification for any governance role for officers other than as the directors may direct.30
Federal law requires that shareholders be able to vote on executive compensation and to
suggest other items for a shareholder vote (even though the outcome of all such votes are
advisory only).31 Federal rules regularly use disclosure requirements to muscle

27

Adam C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices
95 Va. L. Rev. 841-926 (2009).
28

Sarbanes Oxleyy & dodd Frank
See Del.cod Ann. tit. 8 §142.
30
Dodd Frank; & Del. 142
31
§14A & 17 CFR 240.14a-8.
29

9

management toward a desired substantive result.32 Litigation under federal antifraud
disclosure rules provides key governance constraints on managers.33
Mark Roe has suggested that Delaware’s role in corporate law is at the sufferance
of the federal government.34 Delaware is aware that if it goes too far, it may provoke a
federal intervention. The result is a dance between the two key parties with the feds
having the ultimate power given their constitutional preeminence. The next part suggests
a more dynamic and less power-oriented description of federalism now visible in
corporate law.
II.

Twenty-first Century Corporate Federalism

While the outlines of corporate federalism as suggested by Roe and others are
clear, in this part I describe how contemporary corporate federalism is less of the power
approach of traditional dual federalism allocating realms between governments and more
of interactive federalism providing room for multiple roles by different levels of
government. The first part of this section describes the array of the current space in
which federal and state governments are interacting in corporate governance. The second
part suggests how contemporary discussions of federalism in other areas might shape the
corporate federalism discussion.

32
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A. The Contemporary Space in which Corporate Federalism Appears
The interstitial way in which the President and Congress have chosen to have
federal law interact with state corporate law over the last 80 years is visible in many
examples. Many of them fit the template of traditional federalism, where courts are
policing a line between federal and state domains, often finding insufficient justification
to support federal occupation.35 This part first provides several prominent examples and
then develops an alternative set that requires a different federalism description.
1. Traditional Federalism Defining State vs. Federal Realms
While federal law did not preempt state corporations statutes in the New Deal
securities legislation, there was nevertheless the potential of substantial overlap between
the two realms—shareholders who bought and sold securities and who were injured by
misrepresentation related to those securities (often by the managers of the corporation)
also suffered loss if the same or related action of those managers violated state law
fiduciary duties. After federal courts implied private rights of actions under antifraud
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, courts had to resolve the relationship
between state and federal law. Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s and early 1970s
permitted a broad overlap. In Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Ins. Co,, for example, the Court stated that Congress did not seek to regulate
“transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement” but then
permitted a federal action in a transaction that was essentially that.36 Six years later in
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, a Court whose membership had shifted since the earlier
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decision, applied a more conventional federalism analysis to a securities transaction
overlapping with state corporate law, declining to permit a federal securities remedy and
leaving the shareholders to their remedy under state law: “the result would be to bring
within the Rule a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state
regulation….Absent a clear indication of federal intent we are reluctant to federalize the
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities,
particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be
overridden.”37
The Court in that same period followed a similar and traditional federalism
analysis as to tender offer regulation, added to the federal securities law in 1968. Some
disappointed bidders sought to use the stated purpose of the Act “to insure that public
shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required
to respond without adequate information” to attack defensives tactics by management.38
The Court declined to read the statute as going beyond disclosure to substantive fairness
and lower courts declined to permit litigants to use this federal law or the commerce
clause to challenge state laws that did not permit bidders a meaningful opportunity for
success.39
The Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit has followed a similar traditional
federalism approach in two opinions two decades apart that struck down rules
promulgated by the SEC as intruding too much into state law. In a 1990 decision, the
court considered an agency rule banning midstream adoption by a corporation of a dual
37

Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 4xx (1977).pin
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
39
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class voting regime, for example, giving management a separate class of shares with 10
or more votes per share and insuring that the holder of such shares would control a
majority of votes even while having made a much smaller percentage investment in the
company’s capital.40 The court rejected such a rule on federalism grounds, “The
Commission would be able to establish a federal corporate law by using access to
national capital markets as its enforcement mechanism. This would resolve a longstanding controversy over the wisdom of such a move in the face of disclaimers from
Congress and with no substantive restraints on the power.”41 Two decades later the
agency passed a rule providing some qualifying individual shareholders the right to
nominate a candidate for director to be included on the company’s proxy.42 This time
Congress had explicitly authorized such rule-making just before enactment of the rule.43
Even so, a panel of the same court struck down this rule for the agency’s failure to
adequately assess the economic effects of the new rule.44
Each of those examples reflects a federalism mindset focused on an “on-off”
switch: there is a federal realm and a state realm and the judiciary is to umpire in which
realm the particular action falls given the context and the statute enacted by Congress. 45
A similar bright line approach is visible in an adjacent area when the conflict is between
federal securities law and state securities law. From the initial passage of the federal
securities act and for 60 years thereafter federal law permitted concurrent federal and
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state regulation of securities issuances.46 In 1996, in response to issuer frustration with
dealing with multiple levels of regulators, Congress reversed the statute, now preempting
state regulation for “covered securities”, a term defined to include most large issuers
subject to federal regulation.47 A similar preemption occurred two years later as to state
class actions based on allegations of misrepresentation if relating to covered securities.48
As with the examples discussed above, the common federalism approach is to assume the
activity is in one realm or the other and to plumb the statute or policy to see which place
it belongs. Such an approach reflects the dual federalism approach of the 1930s.49 While
it could describe some issues of securities regulation, contemporary discussion is not an
on-off switch but a more interactive analysis as developed in the following section.
2. Interactive Federalism in the Corporate Space.
More recent examples of federal-state interaction look somewhat different than those
just described and show a more nuanced interaction between federal and state law.
Congress has explicitly chosen not to embrace an exclusive and non-overlapping sphere
in most areas of the corporate space so that a separate analytical framework in necessary
to analyze federalism question.
a. Misrepresentations in shareholder voting
When the Supreme Court in J. I. Case v. Borak in 1964 found an implied private right
of action under Rule 14a-9 for misrepresentations in proxy solicitations it expanded
shareholder rights beyond what state law provided them vis a vis their managers and
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directors.50 Delaware’s statute, then as now, had no explicit requirement for any
disclosure when a shareholder vote was sought nor specific enforcement provision
beyond general fiduciary duty.51 Even though the Court a decade and a half later rejected
the Borak reasoning, it declined to question the actual holding of the case so that the
federal remedy continues to be available for shareholders whose proxy is being
solicited.52 So look what has happened: the federal presence has receded, at least
substantively, while Delaware has fully adopted the important parts of 14a-9 law for itself
and become the major presence in disputes relating to proxy disclosure.
Delaware courts first declared that directors’ fiduciary duty includes disclosing “fully
and fairly all material information within the board's control when it seeks shareholder
action.”53 In determining what is material, Delaware courts explicitly adopted the federal
standard initially proclaimed in a Rule 14a-9 context by the U.S. Supreme Court in TSC
v. Northway,: a statement is material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”54 Delaware’s Chief
Justice Leo Strine, in an earlier opinion written while he was on the chancery court,
explained the efficiency in not retracing issues already resolved by federal law, in the
context of the adequacy of disclosure related to directors conflicting interest, one of core
issues of Delaware corporate law:
Federal regulations and exchange rules address disclosure of this kind in a
detailed manner that balances the costs of disclosing all past relationships
against the need to give stockholders information about some prior
50
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See e.g. Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc. 650 A 2d 1270, 1277 ( Del. 1994).
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relationships that, while not rendering directors non-independent of each
other, are important enough to warrant disclosure. Those bodies of
authority should not be lightly added to by our law.55
If a shareholder has two remedies for disclosure violations, one at state law and one at
federal law; which one would you pursue? It turns out Delaware has additional remedies
beyond those available under Rule 14a-9. Revlon, for example, requires a board to get
the best price when a company is up for sale.56 Or perhaps Blasius might be available
which can invalidate board defensive tactics that interfere with the shareholder franchise
unless the board can show a compelling purpose.57 These state law remedies can be
much more valuable to shareholders than the federal remedy as shown in a well-known
Delaware case, In re Topps Company Shareholders Litigation.58 Not only did the
shareholder plaintiffs get an injunction until there was corrective disclosure, but the court
required the board to release a potentially higher bidder from a Standstill Agreement that
had effectively locked that bidder out of the bidding. Not surprisingly, Rule 14a-9 suits
are less often used, but the interaction between the two sets of laws has been instrumental
to the evolution of a more complete remedy for shareholders.
Forum-shopping for litigation challenging mergers has recently created new space
for disclosure litigation in federal courts. The number of merger deals generating
litigation increased substantially in the years after 2008, reaching 96% of all deals in
large corporations in 2013.59. Empirical findings that these lawsuits are typically settled
without material benefit to the shareholders but with a significant fee to attorneys filing

55
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the case provoked concern about this pattern and various calls for reform. Perhaps the
most visible change was push back from Delaware courts during 2015 and the January
2016 decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery, In Re Trulia.60 There the court
announced a policy of disapproval of merger disclosure settlements that did not benefit
shareholders but did compensate attorneys. Not surprisingly, there has been movement
away from the Delaware courts to courts of other states or to federal courts for
corporations incorporated under the laws of Delaware (and who therefore could bring suit
there under the state law just discussed. Cain, Fisch, Davidoff Solomon & Thomas, show
an increased share of disclosure-only settlements occurring in federal courts—0 in six of
eight years prior to 2010 rising to 18% of settled cases in 2015 and 31% in 2016
(although still a fairly small in absolute number of cases.).61
It seems unlikely that such disclosure=only settlements presage a significant
increase in the federal presence shareholder disclosure and voting cases. And even here
we see evidence of interactive federalism. Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh
Circuit in a 2016 endorsed and applied Trulia to a federal case:
Delaware’s Court of Chancery sees many more cases involving large
transactions by public companies than the federal courts of our circuit do,
and so we should heed the recent retraction by a judge of that court of the
court’s “willingness in the past to approve disclosure settlements of
marginal value and to routinely grant broad releases to defendants and sixfigure fees to plaintiffs’ counsel in the process.62

60
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b. Misrepresentations as to shareholder buying or selling
The evolution of the 14a-9 remedy is more surprising in contrast to the adjacent
evolution of the antifraud remedy available under Rule 10b-5. Each provides an antifraud remedy for shareholders-- the 14a-9 remedy in connection with shareholder
decisions to vote and 10b-5 in connection with decisions to buy or sell. Voting and
selling are two of the three core rights provides to shareholders under state law (suing
being the third).63 Logic might suggest some general alignment across the two functions.
Yet as shareholder voting suits have prospered in state law, making use of prior federal
developments just discussed, the opposite has happened as to shareholder buying and
selling. Shareholder class actions in federal law under Rule 10b-5 continue at a steady
pace, even after the PSLRA in 1995 imposed more stringent restrictions of several of the
elements required for plaintiff to recover and defendants continue to vigorously litigate
each of the elements required for recovery.64 In contrast, Delaware precedent has made it
very difficult to proceed with a class action under state law in a buying and selling
situation. 65These cases are difficult to explain by reference to traditional federalism
focused on blanket categories that are either state or federal.
c. Changing the method for director voting
There are other similar examples of the interactive element of corporate
federalism. The usual state law threshold required for a director to be elected is a simple

63
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plurality, i.e. more votes than the other candidate.66 But in most corporate elections,
there is not any candidate other than the slate put forward by management. The SEC,
pursuant to its authority under Section 14(a) to regulate proxies, has required that issuers
include a box by which shareholders can “withhold” their vote. But even if a majority of
shareholders withheld their votes, the candidate would still cross the plurality threshold.
A shareholder .or a group of them could run their own candidate, but success there
requires a shareholder to incur the expense of seeking proxies sufficient to get more votes
than the management candidate, an expense that individual shareholders and even
activists find daunting. As a more economical alternative that still provides a strong
communicative message to management, shareholders have sometimes pursued “majority
voting” bylaws that requires a candidate who gets a plurality but less than majority to
resign and may provide that board must look elsewhere for a replacement candidate (or
alternatively under some bylaws to permits the board to decline the resignation or
reappoint the director.)67 Governance is a process that flows back and forth between state
rules and federal rules and intentionally so. Federalism needs to adapt to such modern
illustrations.
d. Shareholder say on executive compensation
The recently enacted federal requirement that shareholders vote on executive
compensation has a similar effect.68 The federal requirement is precatory, that is to say
advisory. Executive compensation is in the province of the board, as is the entire
management of the business under Delaware §141. If the company’s executive
66
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compensation plan gets less than a majority of shareholder votes, it can still go into
effect. Directors get to do that as part of their comprehensive power. For this “say on
pay” process to have the desired effect, directors must willingly take the advice of their
shareholders or shareholders must be willing to use their vote at a subsequent meeting on
an issue they do get to decide under state law- that of picking directors. It turns out that
the mutual funds and other institutional investors that together own 70% or more of the
shares in American corporations have been willing to use their vote against members of
the compensation committee of corporations that fail to get sufficient support in the say
on pay vote. Indeed, some institutional investors are willing to trigger such opposition if
the company’s pay plan gets a majority but less than a supermajority, say below 70 or
80%. Of course, this subsequent shareholder vote on directors may be a “withheld” vote,
subject to the variations discussed above unless the institutional investor is willing to run
a slate of candidates in opposition to the company’s slate. The role of proxy advisory
firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), has been important in all of this in
terms of putting pressure on boards. What we have, then, is a combination of state law
rules on voting, federal law rules on advisory voting or withheld votes, and private
ordering in the sense of institutional shareholders deciding the threshold at which they
will employ each of their state and federal voting rights. 69
e. Removing staggered boards
There are other examples as well. The rapid decline of staggered board over the
last decade, after two earlier decades of seeming invincibility to shareholder efforts to get
rid such a rule, reflects a similar combination to that just described. Staggered boards
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mean one third of the board is elected at each annual meeting so that at least two
successive successful proxy campaigns must be run to get control of the board against the
wishes of the incumbents. Few insurgents have been willing to tie up their capital for
such a period. The state law rules that require boards to approve of any change to the
articles before those changes are put to a shareholder vote effectively gave the board a
blocking position against efforts to remove the staggered board provision. Even if
shareholders succeeded in a getting a majority of votes on a 14a-8 proposal seeking the
end of staggered boards, the board could decline to take action, as discussed above. Only
when enough institutional shareholders were willing to vote against non-agreeing
directors at the next election for directors (or made an effective threat to do so) were
boards willing to take the step to agree to changes in the articles. In the space of a few
years staggered boards have practically disappeared from the largest American public
corporations.70
f. Voting by institutional shareholders
Federal regulators, initially the Department of Labor overseeing fiduciaries of
retirement funds held for the benefit of workers, required those fiduciaries to vote those
shares held in various plans, something that plan managers had not often done given that
economic incentives seldom made voting worthwhile.71 The result was to grow the
business of proxy advisory firms in helping funds meet such requirements and in turn to
introduce a new player in corporate governance.
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This shared governance authority among state law corporate rules, various and
often isolated federal rules, and the private ordering preferences of institutional investors,
most of whom are agents for retirement plans, has dramatically changed corporate
governance in the twenty-first century. In the examples just described, the corporate
governance moved away from the default rule of traditional corporate law, but it was not
a change in state statutory or common law that directly produced the result. Nor was it
the explicit displacement of state law by federal law. It certainly did not reflect any race
between different states. Most often, it was a (somewhat small) change in federal rules
that generated greater activism by institutional investors to use one of the relatively few
rights that traditional state law gives to investors. This is federalism not like what we
have seen before in corporate law and requires a somewhat broader conception of
corporate federalism to fully capture it.

B. Contemporary Theories of Federalism as Reflected in the Corporate Law Context

Until the New Deal, “dual federalism” dominated the discussion of allocating who
makes law under the American constitutional system. State and federal governments
were seen as having exclusive control of non-overlapping regions of authority; courts
were charged with defining and monitoring the line. At the time of the point of inflection
of state law and continuing through the New Deal, corporate law would have been
considered within the state realm, whether the particular state took a laissez faire or more
regulatory view toward the law that was enacted. After the economic and social
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disruption of the Great Depression, the executive and legislative branches greatly
expanded the regulatory state including the first federal securities laws with various
sections addressed to corporate governance. The Supreme Court’s acceptance during
President Franklin Roosevelt’s second term of the broader federal presence in many areas
led to a blurring of the “exclusive” regions for the federal government and the states so
that “overlapping state and federal regulation has become the norm for many, if not
most” areas of regulation.72 Thereafter, dual federalism was dead, but as Robert
Schapiro observed, “its spirit continues to haunt contemporary discussions of
federalism…the dualist conception of federalism as a line-drawing exercise persists.”73
The Court of Appeals’ focus in the two Business Roundtable cases discussed in section
IIA above suggests such a line-drawing focus. In contrast, the American discussion of
federalism in recent decades has “has moved to a more dynamic or cooperative
federalism approach in many areas that were formerly within the exclusive realm of the
states, such as health, safety, and environmental protections.”74 And, it might be said for
our purposes, corporations. Various adjectives have been added to federalism to make
this point and different authors have sometimes suggested different meanings for the
same adjective. Cooperative federalism, for example, could mean the federal government
establishing national standards or permitting requirements and then delegating to the
states to administer the regulation including whether to grant or deny permits.75 But it
often means more of a shared role. Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson argue that such
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concurrent regulation results “in a regulatory regime superior to what could be achieved
by independent activity of each one” citing benefits form “plurality, dialogue, positive
redundancy, greater regulatory competition, policy innovation and resistance to
monopolies and group capture.”76 For some, this approach to federalism pushes
differences of opinion to be resolved in the political branches—for state governments for
example to protect themselves in Congress, leaving courts to a more passive role.77 The
Business Roundtable decisions discussed above might well fall short under this approach.
What has sometimes been called Process Federalism emphasizes similar values, pushing
as many decisions as possible into the Congressional sphere where states ae represented
and using “clear statement rules” to incentivize more specific congressional findings and
debate.78 State interests are better “protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations of federal power.”79
The recent examples in corporate law discussed above illustrate the rich and more
nuanced interaction that results when there are multiple points of entry for different
parties in interest seeking to resolve disputes in a collective enterprise. Even with a more
passive judicial role, the process of Congress and the state governments setting forth rules
would benefit from a more explicit discussion of which level of government is better
suited to determine particular rights and rules. Many such discussions derive from a
rational choice model, looking to methods of maximizing social welfare, aggregating
preferences, and responding to market failures in private ordering. Consistent with the
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federalism focus of this discussion, David Spence, drawing on work by Peter Menell &
Richard Stewart and William Eskridge & John Ferejohn, among others, suggests four
traditional rationales used to justify federal regulation of externalities and proceeds on the
assumption that federal regulation is appropriate when one or more of these rationales
applies.80
•

regulation at the lowest element of government that geographically
encompasses the costs and benefits of the regulated activities, a rationale
that would justify federal regulation for pollution that spills over state
boundaries;

•

a focus on the capacity or willingness of state governments to regulate, for
example, as in a race to the bottom context that has long been discussed in
corporate law that if true would make reliance on state law questionable or
if the jurisdiction is vulnerable to regulatory capture, which may be more
likely in a smaller, concentrated jurisdiction than for the country as a
whole;

•

a need for uniform standards, one justification given for the preemption of
state securities registration requirements where issuers seeking to raise
money across multiple jurisdictions complained of the expense of having
to comply with 50 sets of state rules as well as the federal standards;
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•

if there is an important national interest in developing an asset or industry,
for example when nuclear energy was first used and regulation was
assigned to the national government.

The particular characteristics of the corporate setting influence the strength of
each of these rationales. The most important distinguishing element in the corporate
setting is the ability of corporations in any place in the country to choose their state of
incorporation and thus the set of state law governance requirements. The internal affairs
doctrine, which is widely accepted across American jurisdictions means that questions of
internal corporate governance are decided based on the law of the state of incorporation,
even if they are brought in federal court under diversity jurisdictions or in the courts of
another state which has jurisdiction. This means only one state law matters, the
corporation cannot be subject to 50 states as when it was selling securities prior to 1996
or when it sells products or engages with consumers across the country and would be
adversely affected by overlapping rules from the various states. Thus the third rationale
above will likely not show up in the corporate law context.
Corporate governance is no doubt important to American competitiveness and
could support an important national interest justification for federal regulation, but the
ability of corporations to choose their state of incorporation reduces the power of this
argument. Even if one state, or many, had bad corporate laws, so long as corporations
had the ability to choose a state with the preferred rules, whatever those might be, there
would be little need for federal preemption (absent a prisoner’s dilemma type situation
caused by a race to the bottom discussed below).
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The first rationale, the spillover across state lines so the regulating state does not
bear the full costs of the regulation (or the absence of regulation), costs which are felt by
other states (for example downstream states in the case of air or water pollution) is less
relevant in the corporate context than for fixed site pollution. To the extent that the
regulating/incorporating state has a different mix of constituencies affected by the law—
for example mostly managers/directors and fewer investors/employees there is potential
for a kind of externalization. This is usually discussed in corporate law if amplified by
the possibility of a race to the bottom discussed immediately below.
The rationale most often used to support federal regulation in corporate law (and
which is vigorously contested) is the second rationale—where the states could find
themselves in a race to the bottom in a context where states would prefer more stringent
regulatory standards, but cannot sustain any cooperative effort to maintain those
standards in the face of temptation in the form of opportunity to attract corporations and
revenue from other states (or not lose home state corporations and revenue to other states
with more permissive corporate laws). The laissez faire changes that spread through state
corporations laws beginning in the 1890s has suggested such a pattern to some. Professor
William Cary’s well-known article in the 1970s advocated federal incorporation
standards as an antidote to the then 80- year old pattern.81 Cary’s article generated a
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strong rebuttal from Professor Ralph Winter and others.82 The issue remains very much
contested with multiple empirical studies on different sides of the issue.
What is important for this discussion is that federal law for more than 80 years
has regularly intervened to displace parts of state corporations law that were seen as too
strongly favoring management, for example. This is often depicted as a fight between
directors/managers on one hand and shareholders on the other. But as Professor Roe has
shown, this pattern can perhaps be better explained by constituencies outside the narrow
set.83 Employees, creditors, consumers or the public, who have little chance to be a
player in debate under state law go to Washington to seek a more receptive law-maker.
Of course, managers and investors can be tempted to seek alliances in Washington DC as
well. Even so the result of such appeals to the federal government pattern over the last 80
has usually produced legal change in the direction of more regulation and fewer
restrictions on management.
III.

Federalism’s Impact on the Current Race Between the States as to Who Makes
Corporate Law

The previous parts present the combination of state and federal law that make up
contemporary corporate law in the United States. Since the 1890s states have been able
to compete for incorporations so that corporations can choose among the various state
regimes for their governing law. Since New Jersey’s 1896 corporations statute the
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dominant approach for these state laws law has been decidedly deregulatory. The
formerly regulatory pattern gave way to enabling statutes that preferenced private
ordering over mandatory state rules, albeit with default rules that provided strong impetus
for centralized control and specialization of function among various corporate
constituencies. Federal law has never formally supplanted the organizational structure
provided by the states, but has regularly displaced particular aspects of the state system.
The usual federal approach evidences a different philosophy than the long-prevailing
view at the state level. These rules typically override private ordering to place additional
obligations on directors and officers or enhance the governance role of shareholders as a
counterweight to centralized control. As described in Part IIA, the result has been a
shared governance space among state law, federal law and private ordering. This part
addresses how the particular way that federalism has developed in the corporate space
affects the race between the states dimension of who makes corporate law.
Delaware’s dominance of the race between the states is well-recognized. About
60% of publicly held companies in the United States are incorporated in that small midAtlantic state and if the measurement criteria were modified to those entities that are
incorporated outside of their headquarters state, Delaware’s share rises into the 80s.
Delaware’s dominance brings real benefits to the state. About 20% of the state’s budget
comes from incorporation fees, reducing what the state needs to ask of its residents to
support its governmental operations. Its preeminence is shared by specific groups with
the state. The legal industry, and particularly the Wilmington corporate bar, enjoys a
prominence and a book of business that would be unexpected for a city of only 70,000.
The corporate service industry and related professions including local universities have
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created distinctive expertise. Perhaps the most visible advantage is seen in its state
judiciary. Most state supreme court justices have low visibility outside of their own state
and trial judges even less. The chief justice and other members of the Delaware Supreme
Court and the five members of the chancery court make most American corporate law.
These judges are feted across the country and internationally, invited to conferences and
provided publication, teaching and post-retirement opportunities that are not available to
other state judges.84
Thus Delaware has good reason to care about its position in corporate law. It
faces two sets of challenges. Another state might attempt to take Delaware’s place, just
as Delaware surpassed New Jersey in the last century. Alternatively (and both can
happen at the same time) Delaware’s preeminence can be eliminated or reduced by
increased federal regulation. In theory challenges from other states could come from
more than one direction i.e. states could push alternative governance rules that were
either more or less regulatory than Delaware’s position. New federal rules could likewise
could move in a more or less regulatory direction. Modeling of the space would need to
include the multiple possible paths.
In reality the choices are much more confined. Given the history already
discussed the starting point creates path dependencies. Delaware and the other states start
from a place that reflects a strongly deregulatory approach and at the same time a
preference for centralized control. The federal government, when it intervenes, almost
always does so via regulation and limiting centralized control. Given the constitutionally
provided dominance of federal power, if used, in most contexts, including corporate law,
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Delaware can’t go so far in preferring management that would wake the bear of federal
action that would narrow the space within which state corporate law would be the
governing rule.
While states desiring to take business from Delaware could theoretically change
their laws to be more regulatory and limiting director power or to move in the opposite
direction, the reality is asymmetrical. It is true that North Dakota’s 2007 revisions of its
corporations statute adopted an intentionally shareholder friendly-approach, but the
state’s effort have hardly been noticed by corporations thinking about reincorporation.85
Any state that wanted to increase the power of shareholders would be competing against
an already large federal footprint that the state change would not likely move the needle
of governance enough to attract the desired attention (and revenue) from corporations.
In contrast, Delaware has faced a considerably greater challenge from states
desiring to make their corporations statues even more pro-management than Delaware.
Several states, for example, have enacted mandatory staggered boards for their
corporations thereby providing incumbents more insulation. Some states have also
rejected Delaware’s enhanced fiduciary duty standards for takeovers seen as having the
potential to tie management hands in such a setting. Nevada has pushed further with
changes such as permitting waivers of fiduciary duty of loyalty in its corporations,
something that Delaware does not do.86
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These, of course, are the kinds of changes in state law that would seem likely to
provoke federal intrusion. Mark Roe has pointed out a limiting factor that affects the race
between states—the feds are much more likely to federalize Delaware law more than a
state with a small market share.87 The result is to alter the risk to companies that could
arise from future changes in a state’s law once companies have reincorporated. Any
state may go too far in a particular direction. The now-traditional pattern of federal law
responding to perceived tilts in Delaware law limits the risk of such changes in Delaware,
but not in the states with a smaller market share.88 The recent study by Ofer Eldar and
Lorenzo Magnolfi provides support for this view, showing Nevada’s growth has been
concentrated in small firms with low institutional shareholder ownership, but not
corporations more generally and suggesting Delaware would lose market share and
millions in franchise taxes if it adopted the stronger management protections of Nevada.89
Conclusion
Determining “who makes corporate law” in 21st Century America requires
understanding the interaction of three overlapping dimensions—the competition between
the states, the choice between regulatory law and private ordering, and the relation of
federal law to state law under current theories of federalism. American corporate law
scholars have tended to over emphasize the first and not updated their priors on the third.
Thinking about federalism, reflected in the broader writings about the topic in the space
beyond traditional corporate law, is much more interactive than at the time of Cary and
Winter’s initial writings on the race between the states. Numerous current examples of
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corporate governance reflect an interaction of state law governance rules, federal
regulation, and private incentives of participants that could not have been seen a decade
ago. The particular effect on the race between the stats is somewhat surprising—
federalism has bolstered Delaware’s position.
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